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ABSTRACT 
 
Many countries, including Nepal, have been affected with highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks. There have been human mortalities in some countries 
and large numbers of poultry either died or were culled due to HPAI. The overall 
objective of this thesis was to improve our understanding of the epidemiology and 
economics of avian influenza (AI), and particularly HPAI, in Nepal.  
We determined the seroprevalence of and risk factors for AI virus antibodies 
presence in ducks in Kathmandu, Nepal. The estimated true prevalence of AI viruses 
(AIV) antibodies was 27.2% [95% Confidence Interval (CI): 24.6- 29.5].  Age of the 
ducks was identified as the only risk factor for AIV seropositivity. Ducks older than one 
year were more likely to be seropositive compared to ducks less than six months of age 
[Odds Ratio= 2.17 (95% CI: 1.07- 4.39)]. This study provided baseline information 
about seroprevalence of AIVs in Kathmandu that will benefit further research to 
differentiate the subtypes of AIVs circulating in Kathmandu. 
We also evaluated alternatives to the current control program (CCP) for HPAI in 
Nepal. The considered alternatives were: (i) absence of control measures (ACM) and (ii) 
vaccinating 60% of the domestic poultry flock twice per year. Cost-benefit analysis 
approach was used to evaluate the economic feasibility of the programs. In terms of the 
benefit-cost ratio, our findings indicated that there is a return of 1.96 dollars for every 
dollar spent in the CCP compared to ACM. The net present value of the CCP versus 
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ACM was US$ 989,918. The vaccination program yielded a return of 2.41 dollars for 
every dollar spent when compared to the CCP. The net present value of vaccination 
versus implementing the CCP was US$ 13,745,454. These results support a continued 
investment into the CCP rather than ceasing to implement government regulated control 
measures and suggest that vaccination may be an even better control alternative.  
In summary, our studies have highlighted the value of epidemiologic and 
economic analysis in research of AI. Our results are expected to lead to an improved 
understanding and awareness of AI in Nepal and to formulation of better control 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious disease primarily of birds caused by 
influenza A viruses. On their surface, AI viruses (AIV) have two types of glycoproteins: 
haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). Based on these glycoproteins AIVs are 
divided into subtypes. Overall, 16 HA (H1 - H16) and nine NA (N1 - N9) subtypes have 
been reported. Recently, in Guatemala, a new subtype of HA (H17) has been discovered 
in little yellow shouldered bats (Tong et al., 2012). Depending upon its ability to cause 
disease, AI is classified into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). All HPAI are caused by H5 and H7subtypes. 
However, not all H5 and H7 subtypes are highly pathogenic (Alexander and Brown, 
2009). That being said, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (2013) has 
defined notifiable AI as an infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus of the 
H5 or H7 subtypes or by any AIV with an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) 
greater than 1.2 (or based on an alternative measure of at least 75% mortality). All the 
H5 and H7 subtypes are considered notifiable because of the risk of low pathogenic H5 
or H7 subtypes mutating into highly pathogenic ones. All AIVs, with HPAI H5N1 
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subtype in particular, are of concern because they have caused disease in humans, in 
addition to occurring in wild and domestic birds (Yee et al., 2009). 
HPAI grabbed global attention in 1997 when, in Hong Kong, 18 humans became 
sick and 6 died from infection with the H5N1 virus. Around that time, there was also an 
outbreak of HPAI at one of the geese farms located in Guangdong Province, China (Xu 
et al., 1999). Subsequently, between 2001 and 2003, multiple outbreaks were detected in 
Hong Kong in wild and domestic birds (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2004).  Relatively quickly, 
H5N1 outbreaks became widespread in several countries in Southeast Asia (between 
2003 and 2004) as well as in Europe and Africa (between 2005 and 2006) (Otte et al., 
2008). As of 2013, more than 60 countries have reported HPAI H5N1 outbreaks (OIE, 
2013). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), between 2003 and 2013 
(April), 374 of 628 people with laboratory confirmed HPAI H5N1 infection have died 
worldwide (WHO, 2013). Mortality in poultry due to HPAI outbreaks is in the millions. 
In addition, in an effort to control the disease at the animal level, millions of poultry 
have been culled and the poultry trade disrupted. All of this has a serious impact on the 
national economies of the affected countries, with the magnitude of impact likely to 
differ across the countries.  
Nepal was free from HPAI H5N1 until 2009, although the adjoining India and 
China were affected with the disease several years prior. The first HPAI outbreak was 
detected in January 2009 in Jhapa, a district bordering India and close to Bangladesh. 
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Since the detection of this first outbreak, there have been a number of additional 
outbreaks in Nepal. More than 35 outbreaks have been officially reported by the Nepali 
government to the OIE. As of January 2013, the total poultry loss in Nepal, either due to 
HPAI related mortality or culling activities to control its further spread, has reached 
nearly 120,000 animals (OIE, 2013). 
Between 2007 and 2011, the government of Nepal has implemented AI 
surveillance activities and an awareness program through the Avian Influenza Control 
Project (AICP) funded by the World Bank. Since 2011, the Nepali government has been 
carrying out the AICP using its own resources. The focus of the control policy 
implemented by the Nepali government has been on the outbreak related culling of 
poultry in conjunction with cleaning and disinfection. After the government has declared 
an area affected by the outbreak, there is a ban on poultry production for a period of 45 
days. Surveillance activities are also intensified near the outbreak areas and other high 
risks areas, such as districts with high poultry density. However, amidst these efforts, the 
number of HPAI outbreaks has been increasing in Nepal. Major commercial poultry 
areas, namely Chitwan and Kathmandu, have already been affected by the outbreaks. As 
poultry density is very high in these areas, culling of poultry has the potential to cause 
economic devastation in these regions.  
The potential for substantial economic losses has triggered a discussion on 
alternative control strategies, such as vaccination of the national poultry flock. Likewise, 
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the continued occurrence of outbreaks, despite the ongoing AICP, questions whether the 
resources spent on the AICP are well spent. However, before making any changes in the 
control strategy, there needs to be a careful evaluation of the economic feasibility of 
different options. There are several economic techniques for the evaluation of disease 
control programs to help in decision making, such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
network analysis, mathematical programming and simulation (Bennett, 1992). When 
long-term control programs are desired at the national level, CBA is the method of 
choice (Dijkhuizen et al., 1995). CBA is mostly used by governments to choose the most 
desirable control policy, based on the comparison between the impact of an intervention 
and its operating cost (Tiongco, 2008).  
Kathmandu is the capital city of Nepal. It is also the most important center for 
poultry trade in Nepal. Poultry produced in several other districts of Nepal are 
transported to Kathmandu for consumption. In addition, Kathmandu district in itself is 
an important poultry production district of the country.  A large number of duck farms 
exist in Kathmandu district. On these farms, ducks are mainly raised in a scavenging 
system, where ducks are allowed to graze freely in the daytime and are kept in their shed 
during the nighttime. These ducks have access to ponds, rivers and other water bodies, 
where they have the opportunity to mingle with wild birds and backyard chickens. Due 
to these production practices, Kathmandu is considered to be one of the highest risk 
districts for HPAI outbreaks in Nepal. While Nepal has experienced outbreaks of HPAI 
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since January 2009, no clinical outbreaks were detected in Kathmandu until January 
2012. Nevertheless, it has been suspected that the virus had been circulating in 
Kathmandu even before the first detected outbreak.  
It is known that infections of H5N1 in chickens and ducks exhibit different 
clinical presentations.  Whereas in chickens the infection is characterized by clinical 
symptoms and high mortality, in ducks the infection is usually asymptomatic, leading to 
underestimation of the disease prevalence (Chantong and Kaneene, 2011). Therefore, 
infected ducks may “silently” help maintain and transmit the infection to other 
susceptible hosts (Henning et al., 2011). Because of its potential silent nature, H5N1 
infection in ducks has been considered a threat to the national poultry flock and public 
health (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2005). Thus, monitoring and surveillance activities 
focusing on ducks are very important for the control of AI. Serology is commonly used 
to detect AI in birds in surveillance programs (Brown et al., 2010). Finding ducks 
seropositive to AIV in the serum samples collected before January 2012 would 
corroborate the suspicion that AIVs (though not necessarily HPAI viruses) were 
circulating among ducks in Kathmandu even before the first detected outbreak.  
This thesis focuses on the epidemiology and economics of AI in Nepal. In 
particular, our interest was in the seroprevalence of and risk factors for AI in 
Kathmandu, Nepal, and the costs and benefits of AI control in Nepal. The following 
sections summarize a review of literature pertinent to these questions.  
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1.2 Literature review 
 
1.2.1 Epidemiology of AI 
AI epidemiology is very complex due to the numerous host species involved, 
many existing and emerging subtypes of AIVs and the role of environmental factors in 
the persistence of AIVs. Outbreaks of HPAI, particularly H5N1, have caused mortalities 
of a huge number of birds. In addition, mortality due to the HPAI H5N1 infection in 
human population has made this disease of high public health concern. Therefore, timely 
control of the disease at the animal (poultry) level is necessary. It is essential to 
understand the epidemiology of AI for its effective control. When studying the 
epidemiology of AI, we need to approach it from the perspectives of the hosts, pathogen, 
environment and their interactions, together with the temporal and spatial patterns of its 
distribution.  
Birds are the main hosts for AIV. As of now, AIVs have been isolated from at 
least 105 species of birds belonging to 26 families (Olsen et al., 2006). Among the wild 
birds, AIVs have mostly been isolated from Anseriformes (e.g. ducks, swans and geese) 
and Charadriiformes (e.g., gulls, waders and terns). Waterfowls are considered important 
reservoirs for AI, mainly LPAI, because they shed the virus through feces into water 
contributing to the fecal-oral spread of the disease.  Among the domestic species, 
chickens and turkeys have been the major species involved in HPAI outbreaks 
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(Alexander, 2000). Domestic ducks can be infected but may not show signs of the 
disease (Songserm et al., 2006). Exceptionally, tigers and leopards were infected in 
Thailand in 2003 after the consumption of infected chicken carcasses (Songserm et al., 
2006). HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Asia, and later in Europe and Africa, have raised the 
concern that the wild birds are playing an important role in the maintenance of influenza 
viruses (Olsen et al., 2006). Among AIV subtypes identified thus far, most have been 
low pathogenic and they have been isolated from wild birds in surveillance studies with 
an overall prevalence of LPAI in ducks and geese of about 11% and about 2% in other 
wild bird species (Alexander, 2007). 
AIVs are influenza A virus under the Orthomyxoviridae family. AIVs are RNA, 
segmented and negative stranded (Capua and Alexander, 2004). Though there are many 
influenza A viruses, HPAI H5N1 virus is of particular concern due to the economic 
losses it causes to the poultry industry and its zoonotic importance. Phylogenetic 
analysis of HPAI H5N1 has shown that the clade 2.2 was dominant both in Asia and 
Europe (Cattoli et al., 2009). Clades are distinct groups within a lineage that share a 
common ancestor or node on a phylogenetic tree (Lu et al., 2007). The clades of H5N1 
have shown continuous evolution posing global threat to the poultry industry and 
humans (Guan et al., 2009). 
Environment plays a crucial role in the transmission of AIVs. AIVs can survive 
in the environment outside the hosts for a considerable period of time. The length of 
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persistence depends upon several factors such as temperature, salinity and pH. It has 
been reported that pH of 7.4- 8.2, temperature below 17°C and salinity (0- 20,000 parts 
per million) are favorable environmental conditions for AIV persistence (Brown et al., 
2009). Nazir et al. (2011) reported that AIVs persisted for 5-11 days, 13-18 days, 43-54 
days and 66-394 days at 30°C, 20°C, 10°C and 0°C, respectively, in the lake sediment. 
HPAI H5N1 viruses from domestic poultry are less persistent to the above 
environmental factors than wild type AIVs (Brown et al., 2009). In a study conducted in 
India, HPAI H5N1 virus survived for 18 hours, 24 hours, 5 days and 8 weeks at 42°C, 
37°C, 24°C and 4°C, respectively (Kurmi et al., 2013). In detached feathers from 
infected domestic ducks, AIVs (H5N1) persisted for 160 days at 4°C and 15 days at 
20°C (Yamamoto et al., 2010).  
For better understanding of AI epidemiology it is necessary to evaluate the 
temporal and spatial patterns of its spread. HPAI outbreaks were very limited before 
they were observed in China in 1996 and in Hong Kong in 1997 (Suarez, 2010).  After 
outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in Hong Kong in 1997, this disease was not reported for 
almost six years from anywhere in the world. Then, in December of 2003, the Republic 
of Korea reported the outbreaks in poultry (OIE, 2013). After that, every year, HPAI 
H5N1 outbreaks have been reported to OIE by different countries. In 2004, outbreaks 
were mainly concentrated in the Asian nations, specifically in Southeast Asian nations 
including Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia (OIE, 2013). There might be 
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several reasons for the rapid spread of the disease in these countries, such as traditional 
backyard poultry husbandry system, large free grazing duck population in the paddy 
fields, weak bio-security system in the commercial poultry, large number of live bird 
markets and poorly monitored extensive poultry movements prevailing in these 
countries. The disease then spread further to other Asian regions, including Middle East 
and some European countries, including eastern part of Russia and United Kingdom in 
2005 (WHO, 2013). In 2006, a record number of 48 countries reported HPAI H5N1 in 
poultry, with 36 countries reporting the disease for the first time. Among these countries 
were now also African nations, including Nigeria and Egypt (WHO, 2013). The higher 
number of countries reporting the disease reflected the fast spread of the diseases but 
might have also been due to an increased awareness and alerts created through OIE, 
FAO, WHO and media that resulted in enhanced surveillance activities and testing of the 
birds.  
In summary, AI has rapidly spread from Asia to European and African countries 
and finally became endemic in Asia (Lupiani and Reddy, 2009). This has triggered the 
need for research to better understand its epidemiology. 
 
1.2.2 Public health importance 
AI became of a global concern when the first human cases of AI were detected in 
Hong Kong in 1997. After a series of additional human cases over the following few 
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years, there was a discussion about the possibility of the next pandemic. In that regard, 
WHO defined six phases of pandemic treat to show how the influenza virus moves from 
the initial human cases to a pandemic state (WHO, 2013). Phase one is a situation in 
which influenza viruses are circulating in animals but there is no infection in humans, 
whereas in phase two, viruses are known to cause infections in humans and the infection 
is thus considered a pandemic threat. Phase three is a situation in which there might be a 
chance of limited human-to-human transmission of AI virus in case of a close contact 
between infected and non-infected humans but which is not sufficient to sustain 
outbreaks at the community level. In phase four, there is a verified human-to-human-
transmission or re-assortment of human-animal influenza virus capable to cause 
community level outbreaks while in phase five there is a human-to-human spread of 
virus into at least two countries in one WHO region (there are six WHO regions: Africa, 
Americas, Southeast Asia, Europe, Eastern Mediterranean and Western Pacific). Phase 
six is a pandemic phase where community level outbreaks are seen in at least one other 
country in a different WHO region in addition to countries within the originally affected 
WHO region. As per an official WHO position, the world is currently at the pandemic 
alert phase three for H5N1 (Pappaioanou, 2009). Human casualties from H5N1 have 
occurred in 15 countries, mostly Indonesia, Egypt, Vietnam and China. The case fatality 
rate of nearly 60% observed for H5N1 HPAI has made this disease of a high public 
health concern (Suarez, 2010). Lack of prior immunity in humans against this subtype 
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might be the reason for such a high case fatality rate. Another strain of AI, H7N9, has 
recently caused infections in humans in China. This has highlighted the further 
importance of AIVs as a zoonotic agent. As of May 9, 2013, 32 people (24.4%) out of 
131 laboratory confirmed H7H9 cases have died (WHO, 2013). Though it is not clear 
whether the current H7N9 infections in humans in China were initiated from an animal 
contact (poultry and swine), more than two-thirds (77%) of the cases had a history of 
contact with live animals, including chickens and pigs, either in the live poultry market 
or on farms (Li et al., 2013).    
There is also a concern about the potential mixing of several influenza viruses 
and creation of a novel influenza virus capable of human-to-human transmission. In this 
regard, mixing of HPAI H5N1 virus, that has already caused disease in humans, and the 
H1N1 virus that caused pandemic in 2009 or any other influenza virus resulting in a co-
infection and possible re-assortment of the virus to create a new highly pathogenic and 
easily transmittable strain is of concern (Amendola et al., 2011). Concurrent circulation 
of HPAI H5N1 and H7N9 virus in China may also provide chance for re-assortment of 
the virus. H9N2 virus should also be included in the human pandemic strain list and 
more research should be conducted to better understand it as it has been done for H5N1 
(Lupiani and Reddy, 2009).   
As of now, the risk of H5N1 virus transmission among humans is little to 
moderate. However, close contact with poultry (infected sick or dead birds) and poor 
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bio-security in poultry farms increases the risk for human infections (Rabinowitz et al., 
2010; Van Kerkhove et al., 2011). The individuals at risk are recommended to follow 
precautions such as proper hand washing and reporting influenza like illness to the 
health authorities (Kelly et al., 2008). In summary, the number of deaths up to now is not 
that high. However, the high case fatality rate seen and the risk of virus re-assortment 
into a strain capable of human-to-human transmission, leading to a pandemic, have made 
this disease of high public health importance. 
 
1.2.3 Avian influenza in ducks 
While ducks (wild and domestic) are relatively frequently infected with LPAI 
viruses they can also get infected with HPAI viruses (Stallknecht et al., 1990). As ducks 
can become infected and co-infected with different AIVs, this provides a chance for re-
assortment of the virus (Chua, 2009). Moreover, ducks are important in the 
epidemiology of AI because they vary in the extent of the expressed symptoms of HPAI. 
For example, in South Korea, breeder ducks showed reduced feed consumption and egg 
production without increase in deaths but in commercial ducks respiratory signs and 
moderate increase in mortality were observed (Kwon et al., 2005). Grazing ducks in 
paddy fields in Thailand did not show any disease symptoms though they were infected 
(Songserm et al., 2006). The expression of AI symptoms in ducks is contingent upon 
several factors, such as age of the hosts, strain of the virus and environmental conditions 
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(e.g.,  weather extremes) causing physiological stress (Kwon et al., 2005). Regarding 
age, in a study conducted by Pantin-Jackwood et al. (2007), the mortality was higher in 
ducks of two weeks compared to those five weeks of age.  
There is a variation in the period the ducks shed the virus once they are infected.  
Shedding of the virus has been reported to last one to two weeks in adults (Hulse-Post et 
al., 2005; Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2005) and up to a month in juveniles (Hinshaw et al., 
1980). The level of virus shedding peaks around the day three of shedding (Sturm-
Ramirez et al., 2005). The long shedding period allows sufficient time for disease 
transmission from one country to another during long distance travel and migration. This 
has been substantiated by the H5N1 detection in apparently healthy ducks in South 
Korea brought from China for slaughter in 2001 (Tumpey et al., 2002). 
Analysis of spatial data on HPAI outbreaks in Southeast Asia has shown that 
scavenging ducks are contributing to HPAI outbreaks in domestic poultry in that region 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2007). In Thailand, there was a positive correlation between grazing of 
ducks in the rice fields and their infection with H5N1 virus (Gilbert et al., 2006). When 
chickens get infected from ducks, signs of clinical disease and high mortality are 
observed (Chen et al., 2004). Thus, ducks are a probable source of disease transmission 
to chickens and even humans (Henning et al., 2010). In summary, ample evidence 
suggests that ducks are playing an important role in the spread of HPAI as they do not 
show symptoms of disease despite being infected. Serological testing of ducks can 
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indicate their exposure to AIVs. Thus, serological studies of ducks are very important to 
know their exposure level to AIVs. 
 
1.2.4 Risk factors for AI in poultry 
Several risk factors for the spread of AI in poultry have been identified. The most 
important one is the global movement of poultry and their products through trade 
(Steensels et al., 2006; Alexander, 2007; Van den Berg, 2009; Yee et al., 2009). In 
addition to formal trade, illegal and informal imports of infected poultry that mainly 
occur between neighboring countries are contributing to the spread of AI (Beato et al., 
2009). Besides trade, the poultry husbandry system is an important risk factor. 
Specifically, the traditional backyard poultry raising and free ranging duck farming 
systems, especially in the developing countries of Asia and Africa, are contributing to 
the spread of AIV as bio-security measures are often weak in these types of husbandry 
systems (Chantong and Kaneene, 2011). Similarly, in Thailand, seasonal flooding of 
paddy fields contributes to AIV dissemination (Gilbert et al., 2006).  
The introduction of AI infection to domestic poultry often occurs through the 
contact with wild birds. AI infection status in wild birds is thus an important risk factor 
for AI infection in domestic birds. In wild birds, different physiologic stresses, such as 
molting and environmental stress due to cold weather, increase their susceptibility to AI 
(Feare, 2010). Climate change is considered another risk factor because it can influence 
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the AIV ecology by changing the virus survival outside the host, migration patterns of 
wild birds and the infection transmission cycle (Gilbert et al., 2008).  
In summary, several risk factors have been identified for the spread of AI in 
poultry. The most important ones are the global movement of the poultry and poultry 
products through legal and illegal trade and the husbandry practices involving traditional 
backyard poultry and free grazing duck farming in developing countries. 
 
 
1.2.5 Costs-benefit analysis 
The CBA technique was first used in the 19
th
 century to analyze the cost and 
benefits of a bridge construction project in France (Ramsay et al., 1999). Though CBA 
has been widely used to make decisions on the economic worth of national or regional 
level projects, it can be equally applicable to make decisions at the farm level (Marsh, 
1999). In CBA, all the relevant costs (C) and benefits (B) are identified and then 
quantified by giving them monetary values, after which they are compared to make 
decisions (Bennett, 1992). In disease control programs, benefits mainly include the 
prevented losses that would have occurred in the absence of a disease control program.  
There are both advantages and disadvantages of using CBA approach. The 
advantage is that costs and benefits are assigned with monetary values. That aids 
decision-making because one can see how much money will be saved or earned in return 
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for the money spent. Furthermore, CBA can compare the competing programs. As a 
down side of CBA, it may be tedious to give monetary values to every relevant cost and 
benefit (Bennett, 1992). Sometimes, the market values are unavailable or are distorted. 
Sometimes, the return in the absolute amount might be more important for the decision 
making than just the ratio. Similarly, CBA compares the advantage in an aggregate and 
doesn’t consider which particular groups in a society are getting more benefits (Ramsay 
et al., 1999).  The outcome from a CBA indicates economic profitability of the change 
being assessed. If carried out at a national or regional level it does not necessarily 
indicate who might bear the costs of the change and who might benefit from that change. 
The CBA also gives no impression of the social acceptability or the financial feasibility 
of the change.  
While performing CBA, one needs to keep in mind that the same amounts of 
money today and in the future have different values. In other words, the money we have 
today is more valuable than the same amount of money in the future. Discounting takes 
account of the time value of money by converting future values to a present value 
(Dijkhuizen et al., 1995). The formula used in the calculation of Present Value (PV) 
from a future value (FV) is: PV= FV / (1+r)
 n
,
 
where r = periodic interest (discount) rate 
and n = number of periods (Marsh, 1999). 
The B-C ratio is calculated by dividing the benefits and costs in their present 
value. It is worth to invest when B-C ratio is greater than one (Dijkhuizen et al., 1995). 
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For example, if the B-C ratio is 5, this means that for each dollar invested, $5 will be 
saved or returned, indicating that the investment is worth pursuing. On the other hand, if 
the B-C ratio is 0.5, this means that for each dollar invested; only half a dollar will be 
saved (or earned) in return indicating that it is not worth to invest. In addition to the B-C 
ratio, the Net Present Value (NPV) can be used to aid decisions about an investment. 
The NPV is the difference between the benefits and costs in terms of their present 
values. A positive NPV indicates that the investment has greater return for that 
investment than its opportunity cost (Dijkhuizen et al., 1995). 
In conclusion, CBA is a method of economic analysis where all the relevant costs 
and benefits of different programs are identified and then compared to choose the one 
worth pursuing. There are both advantages and disadvantages of the CBA approach, as 
we discussed above, nevertheless, this is the most commonly used approach to evaluate 
the disease control programs at a national or regional level.  
 
1.2.6 AI vaccination 
Vaccination has been a very important tool in the control of many infectious 
diseases, including AI. Vaccination against AI boosts an individual host’s  immunity to 
an infection and thus the population of susceptible hosts decreases (Capua and 
Marangon, 2003). In case of virus introduction, it reduces the load of circulating viruses 
(Hinrichs et al., 2006). Vaccination has been considered as an option in the control of 
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HPAI when the outbreaks are massive and culling of poultry becomes uneconomic and 
impractical. However, there are debates over the use of vaccination for controlling AI. 
The main concern is the possibility of silent spread of the disease as vaccinated birds 
may still shed the virus (Ellis et al., 2004). It is also difficult to distinguish vaccinated-
infected from vaccinated-non-infected animals (Capua and Marangon, 2003). On these 
grounds, several poultry importing countries have imposed trade bans from countries 
having vaccination policy for AI control. Recently, a new technology has been 
developed, called DIVA (differentiating infected from vaccinated animals), that can 
differentiate infected from vaccinated birds (Suarez, 2012). With the development of 
DIVA, poultry trade between countries can resume even if vaccination is used. However, 
vaccination program should always be conducted together with strict bio-security and 
surveillance activities (Koch et al., 2009) because of the possibility of vaccinated birds 
shedding the virus and silently spreading the disease.  
Several countries have used vaccination against AI. Countries that have used 
vaccination to control HPAI H5N1 are Pakistan, Vietnam, Egypt, France, Russia and the 
Netherlands. Mexico, Italy, USA, El Salvador and Guatemala have used vaccination 
against LPAI H5 and H7 (Swayne et al., 2011). Pakistan successfully controlled the 
spread of HPAI H5N1 through mass vaccination and bio-security measures (Naeem, 
2003). Success of vaccination depends on the proportion of the population that is 
vaccinated. For the effective control of the infection, it has been considered that at least 
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80% of the total poultry population needs to be vaccinated (Tiensin et al., 2007). 
However, in practice, that is difficult to achieve because of the fast turnover of poultry 
and large number of backyard poultry particularly in developing countries. In a nutshell, 
vaccination is one of the several options for the control of AI particularly when 
outbreaks are massive and stamping out is not feasible. However, there are several 
constraints of AI vaccination, as we discussed earlier, which makes its use debatable. 
 
1.3 Overall objectives and outline of this thesis 
The overall objective of this thesis was to improve understanding of the 
epidemiology of AI and the economic worth of its control in Nepal. This overall 
objective has been addressed through two independent chapters. In Chapter II, we have 
estimated the seroprevalence of ducks carrying antibodies against AIV in the major duck 
raising areas of Kathmandu, Nepal and assessed the effect of age, sex and size of the 
farm on the presence of AIV antibodies in domestic ducks. In Chapter III, we evaluated 
the costs and benefits of AI control in Nepal. This assessment was important as Nepali 
government has been interested in the economic worth of alternatives to the current 
control program for HPAI implemented since 2007. Finally, in Chapter IV, conclusions 
and summary of the methods and results of the two studies have been presented with 
recommendations for potential future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
CROSS-SECTIONAL SEROSURVEY OF AVIAN INFLUENZA ANTIBODY 
CARRIAGE IN DUCKS OF KATHMANDU, NEPAL  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Avian influenza (AI) is caused by influenza A viruses. While AI is mainly a 
disease of birds, humans and other mammals can also become infected (OIE, 2013). AI 
viruses (AIV) are classified based on their surface glycoproteins. The diverse AIV are 
not equally pathogenic. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is caused by viruses 
of the H5 and H7 subtypes; however, not all viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes are 
highly pathogenic (Alexander and Brown, 2009). There have been outbreaks of HPAI 
H5N1 in poultry in several countries and humans have been infected in some of those 
countries. As of April 26, 2013, out of 628 laboratory confirmed human cases of HPAI 
H5N1 since 2003, 374 have died (WHO, 2013). Due to this reason and huge economic 
loss it causes to the poultry industry, AI, particularly HPAI, has been of major concern 
worldwide, including in Nepal. Nepal was free from any HPAI until January of 2009, 
when the first outbreak of HPAI H5N1 was detected in backyard chickens in the eastern 
district of Nepal. This region of Nepal borders West Bengal, India and is in close 
proximity to Bangladesh where HPAI outbreaks have been reported. Since this initial 
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outbreak, Nepal has faced several additional outbreaks of HPAI, predominately in the 
winter months. 
Ducks play an important role in the ecology of AIV. In the HPAI H5N1outbreaks 
that occurred in the Southeast Asian countries, grazing ducks were found to have played 
a key role in the transmission of the infection (Tiensin et al., 2005). This is likely due to 
the fact that ducks can harbor the virus, yet they remain asymptomatic, thus, helping in 
the silent spread of the disease (Songserm et al., 2006).  When domestic and wild ducks 
share the same wetlands, they can transfer the infection to each other and help in the 
maintenance and spread of AIV (Kim et al., 2009). Serological tests are commonly used 
to detect AIV infections (Brown et al., 2010). Due to the role ducks play in the 
epidemiology of AI, it is of interest to determine the seroprevalence of antibodies to AIV 
in ducks.  
Nepal is a Himalayan country that lies between India and China. The country is 
divided into 5 developmental regions, 14 zones and 75 districts. Each district consists of 
village development committees and municipalities. Livestock sector is important 
contributor to the gross domestic product (around 10%) in Nepal and duck farming is a 
small component of it. Ducks are mostly raised as backyard birds under scavenging 
system where they are allowed to graze and have access to nearby ponds and streams 
during the daytime and are kept in enclosures during the nighttime.  
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Based on the national surveillance plan for HPAI in Nepal, Kathmandu district is 
classified as a high risk district for the disease by the Nepali Government. Kathmandu’s 
high risk classification is based on the high density of commercial poultry in the district, 
the high volume of poultry being moved into Kathmandu from other districts, the large 
number of free ranging ducks, the large number of natural and man-made ponds and 
lakes (where large numbers of migratory birds come every winter), the presence of live 
bird markets, and poor bio-security in commercial poultry farms. No outbreaks of HPAI 
were detected in Kathmandu until January 2012.  However, it was suspected that the 
virus circulated in Kathmandu before that, but the country’s surveillance system did not 
detect it because only a small number of samples were tested. Motivated by this 
suspicion, in 2011 we initiated a serosurvey of domestic mallard ducks (Anas 
platyrhyncos domesticus) in Kathmandu with the following objectives: (1) to estimate 
the prevalence of seroconversion to AIV in domestic ducks and (2) to assess the effect of 
age, sex and size of the farm on the carriage of AIV antibodies in domestic ducks.  
Additionally, we were interested in the number of duck farms, particularly those with 
seropositive ducks, that also keep pigs because pigs could serve as mixing vessels for re-
assortment of influenza viruses (Yasuda et al., 1991).   
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Study design 
We conducted a cross-sectional study from April through July of 2011 in the 
major duck-raising areas of Kathmandu district. The target population consisted of 
domestic ducks from the major duck raising areas of Kathmandu district where the risk 
of HPAI was considered to be high because of the large duck population, frequent 
mixing of chickens and ducks and weak bio-security measures on the farms. The source 
population consisted of ducks from 9 of those areas (Figure 1) in the Kathmandu district. 
These 9 major duck raising areas were identified by the district livestock service office 
of Kathmandu based on a high duck population size. To select the study farms, within 
each area, we selected the first farm randomly. A farm that was located 3-4 farms away 
from the first farm in a random direction was selected for sample collection and this 
process was repeated for selection of additional farms. Within each farm we collected 
blood samples from a certain number of ducks (described in the next section). A target 
number of farms to be enrolled were not predetermined. Rather, the farms continued to 
be enrolled and the ducks sampled until the estimated duck sample size was reached.    
 
 2.2.2 Sample size estimation and sampling 
Duck sample size was calculated using WinEpiscope® 2.0 Software (University 
of Edinburgh, 2007, United Kingdom). Assuming that seroprevalence would be at least  
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Figure 1. Map of Kathmandu district showing sample collection areas (village 
development committees) in yellow. 
 
 
 
1% if AI infection is present in the area, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) and the 
population size of 25,000 ducks in the nine enrolled areas, the estimated sample size was 
297 ducks.  We collected 310 samples to accommodate for possible losses during serum 
separation. These samples were collected from 62 farms of different sizes in terms of the 
number of ducks they kept, which was in the range from 1 to 1,050 ducks per farm. To 
select individual ducks within a farm, we asked farmers to enclose all of the ducks in the 
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enclosure where they were normally kept during feeding. The number of ducks sampled 
per farm ranged from 1 to 17 depending upon the farm size and farmer’s cooperation; 
the mean proportion of birds sampled per farm was 18% (median= 7%, range= 1-100%). 
Likewise, the distribution of sex among the sampled ducks roughly matched the sex 
distribution in the flock. Age, farm size and the presence of swine on the farm were 
recorded based on the information provided by farmers. Sex was recorded based on the 
farmers and investigator’s (SK) personal observation on the basis of feather colors and 
the sound produced. Ducklings, less than 4 weeks old, were excluded as it was difficult 
to collect serum samples from that age group. Samples of five ml of blood were 
collected from a wing vein from individual birds. 
Serum was separated by keeping the syringe containing the blood on a 45
o
 slant 
for about 2 hours at room temperature. The separated serum samples were collected in a 
serum vial and transported to the Central Veterinary Laboratory, Kathmandu, in a cool 
box containing ice packs at 4ºC and stored at -20ºC for 2 weeks until testing. The 
samples were tested for the presence of antibodies to AIV using IDEXX Influenza A Ab 
test kit (IDEXX Laboratories, USA) with results being expressed as sample to negative 
control (S/N) ratio. To classify the ducks as positive or negative, the manufacturer 
recommended cut–off value was used. Specifically, S/N≥ 0.5 was considered as negative 
and S/N< 0.5 as positive. According to the manufacturer, the sensitivity and specificity 
of this test are 95.4% and 99.7% respectively (IDEXX, 2013).  
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2.2.3 Data management and analysis 
Unless otherwise stated, the analyses were performed at the individual duck 
level. The result of the ELISA test (positive/negative) for the individual ducks 
represented the outcome variable. The considered explanatory variables were: duck’s 
age (categorized as less than 6 months old, 6 – 12 months old and more than 1 year old) 
and sex, as well as the farm size. We categorized age into 3 categories based on the 
practice of maintaining the ducks in the flock. Below six months of age, they are not yet 
considered ready for market. From 6 to 12 months of age, they are ready to be marketed 
and may be sold at any time. Ducks older than 1 year of age are generally maintained in 
the flock for laying and breeding purposes and kept for a longer time period, generally 3-
4 years. Regarding farm size, accounting for the husbandry practices of ducks in 
Kathmandu, the farms were categorized as small (less than 50 ducks), medium (50 to 
500 ducks) and large (more than 500 ducks). The apparent duck seroprevalence, with 
95% CI, was calculated by dividing the number of positive samples by the total number 
of samples tested. The true prevalence, with 95% CI, was then estimated by using the 
formula: True prevalence = (Apparent prevalence+Specificity-1)/ 
(Sensitivity+Specificity-1) (Dohoo et al., 2003). Farms were considered positive when at 
least one sample from that farm tested positive. 
For statistical analyses, we used SAS 9.3 software (SAS Institute Inc., North 
Carolina, USA). The Pearson’s Chi-square test was used to evaluate the bivariate 
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association between the outcome and the individual explanatory variables. Variables 
with a P-value < 0.2 were considered in the multivariable analysis. The liberal 
significance cut-off of 20% was used to assure that potentially influential variables 
(including potential confounders) were evaluated in the multivariable analysis while 
keeping in mind the risk of making a Type I error at the bivariate analysis level. 
Multivariable analysis was performed using the generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
approach (the PROC GENMOD command in SAS) to account for the clustering effect at 
the farm level. To evaluate the appropriate correlation matrices, the QIC criterion was 
used (Pan, 2001). We ran the model with different correlation matrices and used a 
Toeplitz correlation matrix in the final model based on its lowest Quasi-likelihood under 
the independence model criterion (QIC) value. To select the final multivariable model, a 
backward variable selection approach was used. Two-way interactions between 
individual explanatory variables were also assessed. P-values less than 0.05 were 
considered significant. The final GEE model was selected by excluding non-significant 
variables. Odds ratio (OR) was used as a measures of association. OR is “the odds of the 
disease in the exposed group divided by the disease odds in the non-exposed group” 
(Dohoo et al., 2003). When OR=1, it means that there was no difference between the 
odds of seropositivity in the exposed and non-exposed groups. The statistical 
significance of OR can evaluated by examining the estimated CI; for example if the 
estimated 95% CI for a OR does not include 1 we are 95% confident that the estimated 
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OR is truly different from 1 meaning that the odds of seropositivity among the exposed 
differs from the odds of seropositivity among non-exposed ducks.  
 
2.3 Results 
A total of 310 ducks on 62 enrolled farms were sampled. Among them, 97 were 
males and 213 were females. The mean and median age of sampled ducks were 49.3 
weeks (95% CI: 41.9-56.6 weeks) and 20 weeks, respectively. Using the Shapiro-Wilk 
test we determined that the distribution of age was not normal (p <0.0001). Thus, rather 
than using age as a continuous variable we classified the sampled ducks into three age 
categories as explained in the Data Management and Analysis section. The mean and 
median number of ducks on enrolled farms were 250 ducks (95% CI: 217- 283) and 113 
ducks, respectively. In total, 31 enrolled farms had swine (200 samples were collected 
from farms having swine) and 31 farms did not have swine (110 samples were from 
farms not having swine). Considering that the number of ducks sampled per farm was 
proportional to the farm size, this means that the farms that had pigs also tended to keep 
more ducks.  
Among 310 tested ducks, 81 were seropositive. At least one duck tested positive 
on 26 out of 62 enrolled farms. The mean and median numbers of positive ducks per 
positive farms were 3.1 and 3.0, respectively. The apparent seroprevalence, at the 
individual duck level was 26.1% (95% CI: 23.6-28.6%) whereas it was 41.9% (95% CI: 
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29.5- 55.2) at the farm level. The true duck seroprevalence, estimated by accounting for 
sensitivity and specificity of the ELISA test used, was 27.2% (95% CI: 24.5- 29.7). At 
the farm level, 51.6% (95% CI: 33.1- 69.8%) of farms with swine had seropositive ducks 
while 32.3% (95% CI: 16.7- 51.4) of farms without swine had seropositive ducks. 
However, the difference in the proportion of seropositive ducks between farms with and 
without pigs was not statistically significant (OR 2.2: 95% CI: 0.8- 6.3).  
In the bivariate analysis (Table 1), at the individual duck level, AI seroprevalence 
was significantly associated with age, sex and farm size at the 20% significance level. 
The apparent seroprevalence was 22.7% (95% CI: 16.5- 29.9), 11.7% (95% CI: 4.8- 
22.6), and 42.5% (95% CI: 32.0- 53.6) in ducks  less than six months of age, between six 
months and one year of age, and older than one year of age, respectively. The 
seroprevalences in male and female ducks were 19.8% (95% CI: 12.2- 29.4) and 32.3% 
(95% CI: 25.8–39.4), respectively. The seroprevalence was 27.4% (95% CI: 21.1- 
34.4%) when swine were present and 30.0% (95% CI: 21.2- 40.0) when swine were 
absent from the farm. The seroprevalences were 19.8% (95% CI: 12.0- 29.8), 29.9% 
(95% CI: 22.5- 38.0), and 37.5% (95% CI: 24.9- 51.5) on small, medium and large 
farms, respectively.  
In the multivariable analysis using GEE, after controlling for clustering of ducks 
within farms, the age effect remained significant (p= 0.01) albeit that was not the case 
for the sex and farm size variables. The model containing only the age was selected as 
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the final model. Based on the final model (Table 2), the odds of being seropositive was 
2.17 (95% CI: 1.07- 4.39) times higher in ducks older than one year compared to ducks 
aged less than six months of age.  
 
 
Table 1. The results of bivariate analysis of association between avian influenza 
seroprevalence in ducks and the individual explanatory variables 
Variable and category Ducks negative Ducks 
positive 
OR
*
 (95% CI
*
) P value 
 No. (%) No. (%)   
Age           
   <6 months 126 (0.55) 37 (0.46) 1 <0.0001 
     6 mths-1 year 53 (0.23) 7 (0.08) 0.44 (0.18- 1.01) 
   >1 year 50 (0.22) 37 (0.46) 2.52 (1.43- 4.41) 
Sex       
   Male 79 (0.34) 18 (0.22) 1 0.04 
   Female 150 (0.66) 63 (0.78) 1.84 (1.02- 3.38)  
Farm size     
   Small farms 74 (0.32) 17 (0.21) 1 0.12 
   Medium farms  112 (0.49) 43 (0.53) 2.12 (1.02- 4.43)  
   Large farms  43 (0.19) 21 (0.26) 1.27 (0.67- 2.38)  
*OR: Odds ratio; CI: Confidence interval 
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Table 2. The final multivariable GEE model of avian influenza antibodies in ducks  
Variable and category OR
*
 (95% CI
*
) P value
 
Age   
   <6 months 1 0.01 
     6 mths-1 year 0.50 (0.18- 1.36)  
   >1 year 2.17 (1.07- 4.39)  
*OR: Odds ratio; CI: Confidence interval 
 
 
2.4 Discussion 
This study describes a cross-sectional study of AI seroprevalence in ducks of 
Kathmandu district, Nepal, which was the first study of the kind conducted in 
Kathmandu. The main finding of the study was seropositivity against AIVs in a quarter 
of the ducks tested in the major duck raising areas of Kathmandu. Ducks older than 1 
year of age were 2.17 times more likely to be positive compared to ducks less than 6 
months of age. Implications and limitations of these findings are discussed below in the 
context of the published literature.  
In late spring/early summer of 2011, the seroprevalence of ducks carrying AI 
antibodies in the major duck raising areas of Kathmandu district, which is classified by 
the Nepali government as a high risk area for HPAI, was 27.2% (95% CI: 24.5–29.7%). 
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This finding supported the suspicion that AIVs were circulating in Kathmandu before 
the first outbreak in poultry reported in January 2012.  
Studies on the seroprevalence of AI antibodies in domestic ducks have been 
conducted in other parts of the world. In cross-sectional studies, high seroprevalences 
have been reported in domestic ducks in Iran (80.9%) (Hadipour et al., 2011), Saudi 
Arabia (35.9%) (Alkhalaf, 2010), New Zealand (30.0%) (Zheng et al., 2010) and West 
Bengal, India (40.6%) (Pawar et al., 2012). The study in New Zealand was conducted in 
high risk areas, which is similar to our study.  The higher seroprevalence observed in 
Iran might be due to the reason that samples were primarily obtained from ducks near 
the wintering grounds of migratory birds where there is a possibility of mixing with wild 
migratory birds. In contrast, antibodies to AIV were not found in domestic ducks in 
Grenada, West Indies (Sabarinath et al., 2011).  This might be due to the low sample size 
(n=16) tested. A lower seroprevalence was reported in domestic ducks in Mali (1–
18.3%) (Molia et al., 2011). 
There have been no reports of HPAI from Kathmandu before January 2012. 
However, the high seroprevalence to AIV among ducks in Kathmandu before that date, 
as determined by the present study, suggests that ducks have been exposed to AIVs 
before the detected HPAI outbreaks. Ducks raised in Kathmandu are transported to 
various locations within the district and even to other districts, for consumption in hotels 
and restaurants. If these ducks are infected, particularly if infected with HPAI virus, their 
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movement could cause considerable damage to the poultry industry in Kathmandu and 
other parts of Nepal. This supports the importance of continued monitoring of 
commercial ducks for AI infection in Nepal. Indeed, in Thailand, distribution of free-
grazing ducks and outbreaks of H5N1 in domestic chicken were correlated (Gilbert et 
al., 2006). Similarly, there is evidence that the virus could spread over long distances 
through trade (Tumpey et al., 2002). The detection of H5N1 virus in ducks in South 
Korea that were imported from China indicates that ducks that look healthy for slaughter 
could also carry the infection (Tumpey et al., 2002).  
In our study birds older than one year showed a higher seroprevalence than those 
younger than 6 months. The reason for such higher seroprevalence in older ducks might 
be due to their longer length of exposure, and the related increased chance for 
seroconversion, compared to young birds. Antibodies become detectable one week post 
infection, peak at about 2 weeks (Jourdain et al., 2010) and may remain in the serum for 
months (Wilson et al., 2013). Most of the association studies of seroprevalence with host 
related risk factors, such as age and sex, have been done in wild birds. Higher 
seroprevalences were reported in adult waterfowls (adults Vs sub-adult (hatch year birds 
of 2-6 months)) in different wild bird species in Alaska (Wilson et al., 2013) and in 
Northwestern Europe (56% in adults, which experienced two winters, Vs in 8% 
juveniles) (Hoye et al., 2011). If we look at the result of infection prevalence studies, the 
prevalence of AIVs are high in juveniles. For example, in a study of wild birds in Texas, 
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USA, juveniles showed a higher prevalence of AIVs than adults (Ferro et al., 2010). This 
may be due to juveniles being immunologically naive compared to adults. When young 
birds become infected with AIVs, they will seroconvert and as antibodies persits in the 
blood for months, antibodies will still be detected when these birds become adults. In 
addition, they can get infected at older age and seroconvert to become AIV antibody 
positive. Thus, it is not surprising to see high seroprevalence in the older ducks, either 
wild or domestic. However, it was surprising to find the lower seroprevalence, though 
not statistically significantly lower, in the ducks aged 6 months to 1 year category 
compared to ducks aged less than 6 months of age. This may be simply due to a low 
statistical power related to a low number of samples tested in this category compared to 
younger and older ducks. Tolf et al. (2013) have reported higher levels of AIV 
antibodies in the first autumn of ducks’ life, a marked drop during the following 
summer, followed by a rise again in the second autumn. Since ducks in different age 
categories in our study hatched at different seasons, they were exposed to AIV for the 
first time at different seasons, after which they may have followed their cohort’s pattern 
of seroconversion and even drop in the antibody levels.  Therefore, it is also possible that 
the detected lower seroprevelance among ducks 6 -12 months of age is real and it may 
reflect the natural variation in the immune response to AIV exposures during a duck’s 
life. The problem is that the natural variation in the immune response affects our ability 
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to detect flocks which had experienced AI infection. Therefore, it is important to 
elucidate further the effect of age on the probability of seroconversion in future studies.   
In our study, female ducks showed a higher seroprevalence than males (OR 1.6: 
95% CI: 0.8–3.2), however that was not statistically significant in the final model. 
Though not significant, females having higher rates of seroprevalence in our study might 
be due to them being maintained in the flock for longer duration of time than males. No 
sex-related differences in wild birds were reported in the seroprevalence of AIV in Italy 
(De Marco et al., 2010). However, they were statistically significant in a study done in 
different wild bird species in Alaska with females having higher seroprevalence than 
males (OR 1.2 (1.1- 1.4)) (Wilson et al., 2013). In another study among wild birds in 
Alaska, males (1.3%) had a higher overall AI prevalence than females (0.6%) (Ip et al., 
2008). These differences might be due to the differences among species, season, 
immunological status of the birds during sampling and sampling variations.  
Pigs are considered to be an important player in the ecology of influenza virus.  
A pig can get infected with influenza A virus from birds as well as humans, which 
makes it a potential mixing vessel. This can be facilitated in an environment where birds, 
pigs and humans remain in close proximity to each other (Brown, 2000). In our study, 
duck seroprevalence did not differ significantly between farms with and without swine 
present. While this may seem reassuring, it is important to remember that 50% of duck 
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farms enrolled in this study kept both ducks and pigs in the close proximity thus 
providing an opportunity for virus exchange.  
In our study, seroprevalence was higher in ducks from larger compared to 
smaller farms.  In the larger farms, generally the number of contacts between the 
individual ducks is higher than on smaller farms. If there is an infected duck on a farm, 
the susceptible ducks would soon become infected after having adequate contacts with 
the infected duck. As chance for exposure between the susceptible and infected ducks is 
generally higher on the larger farms compared to the smaller ones, the observed 
increasing seroprevalence on the farms of increasing sizes was expected. However, the 
difference in seroprevlence among farm size categories was not statistically significant. 
This lack of statistically significant difference may be due to an insufficient power of the 
study to detect the difference or similar husbandry practices and bio-security regardless 
of the size of a farm. Mostly, ducks are allowed to go to nearby ponds or streams for 
grazing during the daytime. During this time, ducks from different farm sizes comingle 
and may transmit the infection to each other.  
The major limitation of this study was its limited geographic coverage and the 
fact that it was conducted at a single point in time. Another limitation is related to the 
focus of our study on high risk sites of major duck raising areas of Kathmandu. In this 
regard, our seroprevalance estimation may represent the upper limit and other areas in 
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Kathmandu might have lower seroprevalence than what we found in this study. 
Therefore, care is needed in extrapolation of results to all the ducks of Kathmandu.  
Nevertheless, as this was the first study to estimate the seroprevalence of AI in 
ducks of the major duck raising areas in Kathmandu, Nepal, this study provided a 
valuable baseline information about the AIV seroprevalence in ducks  in the region. The 
findings indicate that AIV circulate widely in Kathmandu (at least in the major duck 
raising areas) with older ducks having higher levels of seroprevalence which may be 
explained by their longer length of exposure. After this study was conducted in 2011, the 
Kathmandu poultry industry experienced several outbreaks of HPAI. Therefore, in future 
studies, we recommend conducting tests, such as hemagglutination inhibition, to 
differentiate the AIV subtypes present in Nepal with a particular interest in the presence 
of HPAI viruses. 
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CHAPTER III 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA CONTROL IN NEPAL  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Avian influenza (AI) is a highly contagious disease caused by type A influenza 
viruses. These viruses infect several species of food-producing birds (chickens, turkeys, 
quails, guinea fowl, ducks, etc.), as well as pet and wild birds (OIE, 2013). Highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 infection has been reported in domestic 
poultry, wildlife, and human populations (Yee et al., 2009).  
HPAI became of global concern when six people died out of 18 laboratory 
confirmed cases in Hong Kong due to HPAI H5N1in 1997 (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2004). 
However, it is believed now that the virus emerged in 1996 on a goose farm in 
Guangdong Province, China (Xu et al., 1999). After 2003, there were outbreaks of H5N1 
in East and Southeast Asia, which gradually spread into Europe and Africa (Otte et al., 
2008).  
Due to its zoonotic potential and ability to cause high mortality in poultry, HPAI 
has received much attention around the world. Of 628 laboratory confirmed human cases 
of HPAI globally between 2003 and 2010, 374 have died (WHO, 2013) and millions of 
birds have either died or been killed in an effort to control the disease. This has caused 
significant economic losses and has provoked discussions about animal welfare. Civic 
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Consulting and Agra CEAS Consulting (2007) are two consulting agencies based in 
Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively, which submitted a report to the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) were they identified direct and indirect losses due 
to HPAI. Direct losses included production losses through culling and mortality, costs 
associated with control measures and other direct production losses, such as staying out 
of business for a period of time. Indirect losses included ripple effects (such as price and 
demand shocks), trade impact, spill-over effects (such as effects on tourism and service 
sectors), and effects to the wider society, such as loss of workforce due to human 
sickness and mortality. 
Nepal faced its first outbreak of HPAI in January 2009 in the eastern part of the 
country, 600 km from the capital of Kathmandu. Since then, multiple outbreaks have 
been reported and thousands of poultry have been destroyed in an effort to control the 
disease. By April, 2013, Nepal had reported a total of 54 outbreaks of HPAI to the OIE 
(OIE, 2013). As a consequence of the outbreaks, either because of culling to control the 
infection or because of the infection-induced mortality, as of mid-April, 2013 Nepal had 
reportedly lost nearly 150,000 birds of various domestic species. 
The Nepali government has been implementing a prevention and control program 
for HPAI since 2007 in an effort to contain the disease as early as possible and minimize 
possible poultry losses due to disease outbreaks. From 2007 to 2010, avian influenza 
control project (AICP) was supported by the World Bank whereas after that Nepali 
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government has been carrying out the control program using its own resources. Major 
control policies implemented are the surveillance of poultry farms and stamping out of 
poultry flocks in the outbreak area up to 3 km from the index case, followed by 
disinfection of the farms. In addition, there is a ban on poultry rearing in the declared 
outbreak area for 45 days after the outbreak has been declared over. Surveillance is 
carried out in a 7 km zone outside the outbreak area for 90 days after the outbreak has 
been declared over. Despite these control efforts, the number of outbreaks of HPAI in 
Nepal has been increasing. Moreover, outbreaks have been reported in the Chitwan and 
Kathmandu districts, which are the hubs for commercial poultry production in Nepal. 
This increase in HPAI outbreaks has questioned whether the effectiveness of the current 
HPAI control program warrants the societal resources spent on it and led to the 
discussion of alternative control strategies, such as vaccination of the national poultry 
flock.  
A decision to change strategies can be facilitated by a comparative economic 
analysis of the current control strategy and possible alternatives. A number of economic 
techniques, such as mathematical programming, network analysis, decision analysis, 
simulation, and cost-benefit analysis have been applied to livestock disease-control 
decisions (Bennett, 1992). Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is typically the method of choice 
when assessing a change in strategy over a long-term period (Dijkhuizen et al., 1995). 
CBA evaluates the impact of an intervention versus the cost of such intervention and is 
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typically used by governments to evaluate the desirability of a given intervention 
(Tiongco, 2008). The objective of this study was to perform a CBA in order to evaluate 
the economic worth of two control alternatives to the HPAI control program currently 
implemented by the Nepali government. The two evaluated control alternatives were: (i) 
ceasing the current control program (i.e., absence of control measures) and (ii) 
vaccinating 60% of the domestic poultry flock twice a year.  
 
3.2 Methods 
We performed a CBA to evaluate the current control program (CCP) in 
comparison with the alternatives (of implementing no control measures or vaccinating 
60% of domestic flock twice a year) that have been considered for control of HPAI in 
Nepal. We used the time frame of 3 years for evaluation of control measures to 
demonstrate the cumulative effect of the considered control options. We used this time 
frame based on the experience of Nigeria where they have performed the CBA of HPAI 
control over a 3 years-time frame (Fasina et al., 2007). The following assumptions were 
made:  
 Unless stated otherwise, control options were evaluated assuming 19 outbreaks 
of HPAI occurring annually under the CCP, which was the number of outbreaks 
that had occurred in 2012.  
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 Ceasing to implement control measures or absence of control measures (ACM) 
would result in a 100% increase of the number of birds dying and being culled 
due to HPAI annually (i.e., the number of affected birds will double every year 
during our evaluation period). This assumption reflected the complete lack of 
information about the expected increase of the number of affected birds under the 
hypothetical absence of control measures and was tested in the sensitivity 
analysis.  
 The market loss due to HPAI outbreaks occurring under the CCP and ACM was 
assumed to be 10% while we assumed no market loss under the vaccination 
option.  
 The vaccination program would prevent 80% of the losses, in terms of death and 
culled birds, which would otherwise occur under the CCP (baseline).   
 A 5% discount rate was used on all costs and benefits to correct the estimated 
costs and benefits for time value of money.  
For each of the control options, we estimated the involved costs and benefits and 
evaluated them as described in the followings sections. Next, the estimated costs and 
benefits were discounted. The discount rate represents the real interest rate which is the 
rate of interest that would be earned in excess of the inflation rate. We used the formula 
by Marsh (1999) to derive the present value (PV) of a future value (FV): PV= FV / 
(1+r)
n
, where, n= number of periods and r = discount rate per period. We calculated the 
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present value of costs (PVC) and the present value of benefits (PVB) using this 
approach. Finally, the control programs were evaluated based on the ratio of the 
estimated and discounted benefits and cost, i.e., benefit-cost ratio (B-C). Furthermore, 
we estimated the net present value (NPV) for the evaluated control programs as the 
difference between the PVB and the PVC. Unless otherwise stated, all the monetary 
values in this study are expressed in US dollars. As of May 20, 2013, the exchange rate 
was 1 US$ = 87.5 Nepali currency (rupees) (Central Bank of Nepal).   
 
3.2.1 Description of the current control program (CCP) 
CCP is the program currently implemented by the Nepali government for the 
control of HPAI in Nepal. This includes surveillance, stamping out operation followed 
by compensation and training and information dissemination activities. These activities 
are guided by a Bird Flu Control Order (BFCO) of Nepali government. The BFCO is a 
legal document by the Nepali Government that officially outlines the country’s AI 
prevention and control practices. 
 
3.2.1.1 Identification of relevant costs under the current control program (CCP) 
Costs incurred during the CCP are related to: (1) Cost of surveillance including 
(a) Cost of farm visits (b) Cost of sampling (c) Cost of testing samples (laboratory 
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costs), (2) Cost of stamping out operations and compensation, (3) Cost of training, 
communication and information dissemination. Each of these costs is elaborated below.  
 
3.2.1.1.1 Cost of surveillance 
Surveillance activities include visiting farms to monitor for the presence of 
disease, sample collection and testing of those samples. The cost of surveillance (which 
includes the costs associated with farm visits by the Animal Health Officials, sample 
collection, and sample testing) were calculated as follows.   
 
3.2.1.1.1.1 Costs of farm visits in the absence of an outbreak 
As part of Nepal’s national surveillance plan for HPAI, the 75 districts within the 
country have been divided into three categories: high risk, medium risk and low risk 
districts based on the criteria that include the poultry population size, domestic duck 
population size, presence of lakes and water bodies, presence of migratory birds, and 
poultry movements. Based on the criteria, Nepal has 20 high risk districts (HRD), 21 
medium risk districts (MRD) and 34 low risk districts (LRD). For the purpose of active 
surveillance, 8 and 4 risk sites have been identified in each HRD and MRD, respectively. 
Only passive surveillance, which is based on the monthly reporting of livestock diseases 
by the district livestock services offices to the veterinary epidemiology center, is 
conducted in the LRDs.  An Animal Health Official visits each HRD and MRD risk site 
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once a week to inspect farms and look for unusual poultry mortalities. During these 
visits, samples are collected if deemed necessary. Animal Health Officials receive US$ 
4.5 per week to cover the cost of gas for their motorcycles and costs associated with 
using their cell phones. As there are 248 total active surveillance sites in the HRDs and 
MRDs, this leads to the total estimated cost of US$ 58,002 per annum (Table 3). 
 
 
 
Table 3. Annual cost of farm visits in the absence of HPAI outbreaks 
 Numbers Total sites  Costs per week Costs per year 
HRD
* 
20 20*8= 160 $4.5*160= $720 $720*52= $37,440 
MRD
* 
21 21*4= 88 $4.5* 88= $396 $396*52= $20,592 
Total Costs   $1,116 $58,032 
*HRD: High risk districts; MRD: Medium risk districts 
 
 
3.2.1.1.1.2 Costs of farm visits during outbreaks 
During an outbreak, active surveillance is conducted within a 7 km radius outside 
of the stamping out zone. Generally, 2 teams, each comprised of 3 Animal Health 
Officials, are deployed for this purpose. The same teams monitor the stamping out zone 
for 6 weeks, as per the provision of the BFCO, after the completion of the stamping out 
operation. They monitor for violation of the re-stocking ban before completion of the 6-
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week stamping out period and for breakage of seals that are kept in the gates of affected 
commercial farms after the completion of stamping out and cleaning. Each member of 
the team receives US$ 4.5 per week as a compensation for fuel and the cost of using 
their cell phones for a total of 6 weeks. Assuming that 19 outbreaks would continue to 
occur annually under the CCP (the baseline), the total cost of farm visits during 
outbreaks was estimated at US$ 3,078 per annum (Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4. Annual cost of farm visits during outbreaks   
Cost / outbreak $4.5 *6*6= $162 
Total cost for 19 outbreaks $162*19= $3,078 
 
 
3.2.1.1.3 Costs of farm visits after outbreaks 
After the completion of the stamping out operation, post-outbreak surveillance 
activities are conducted in a 7 km area outside the stamping out zone. For this purpose, 
generally 2 teams, each comprising of 3 Animal Health Officials, are deployed. Each 
member of the team receives US$ 4.5 per week for fuel and the cost of using their cell 
phones for a total of 6 weeks, as per the provision of BFCO. Considering 19 outbreaks 
per year, the total cost of postoperative surveillance is US$ 3,078 per annum (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Annual cost of farm visits as part of post-outbreak surveillance  
Cost / outbreak $4.5 *6*6= $162 
Total cost for 19 outbreaks $162*19= $3,078 
 
 
3.2.1.1.4 Cost of sample collection 
As per the national surveillance plan for AI in Nepal, a total of 12,780 samples 
(tracheal and cloacal swabs, serum samples, dead birds, and fresh feces) (Appendix 1) 
are collected across the country annually. Based on the tentative market costs in Nepal, 
US$ 0.57 should be sufficient to purchase a sampling kit set, comprising of 1 syringe 
and needle, 1 pair of gloves, cotton swabs, disinfectant (70% alcohol), small plastic bag 
and serum vials. The total estimated cost for collection of samples was thus 
12,780*$0.57 = US$ 7,285. 
 
3.2.1.1.5 Cost of testing samples (laboratory costs) 
 
  In 2011, a total of 6,596 samples were tested with the type A AI antigen rapid 
test kit (Bionote, Republic of Korea), 524 serum samples were tested with the type A AI 
antibody ELISA test kit (Idexx Laboratories, USA), and 191 samples were tested with 
the reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) (Bio-Rad Laboratories, 
USA) at the Central Veterinary Laboratory and in regional veterinary laboratories in 
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Nepal (Annual Bulletin of CVL, 2010/11). We assumed the same numbers were tested in 
2012 as data for 2012 was not available. The lower number of samples tested than 
collected might be due to pooling of samples from the same farm or household for 
testing. In addition, some samples may have been rejected by laboratory due to quality 
issues. When a sample is positive for H5 by RT-PCR, it is sent to the OIE reference 
laboratory at Weybridge, United Kingdom, for final confirmation of HPAI for the first 
case in a year. Subsequent samples are tested only in Nepal with the RT-PCR and an 
outbreak is declared when there is a positive result. The total annual cost of laboratory 
testing was calculated as the sum of the costs associated with the cost of type A antigen 
rapid test kits, type A antibody ELISA tests and RT-PCR tests as shown in Table 6. The 
estimated total cost was US$ 46,817. 
 
 
Table 6. Annual cost of laboratory tests 
Tests Number tested Cost / test Total costs 
Type A AI rapid tests 6,596 $6.7 6,596*$6.7= $44,193 
RT-PCR  191 $7.7 191*$7.7= $1,471 
Type A Ab ELISA tests 524 $ 2.2 524*$2.2= $1,153 
Total costs of all tests   $46,817 
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3.2.1.2 Cost of stamping out operation and compensation  
The average cost of stamping out operation and compensation based on the 
experience of previous HPAI control in Nepal, as mentioned in the Implementation 
Completion and Results Report, is US$ 10 per bird (World Bank, 2013). During the 19 
outbreaks that had occurred in 2012, 18,110 birds were destroyed in an effort to control 
the disease. Thus, the total cost of stamping out and compensation was estimated as 
18,110 birds culled* US$ 10 = US$ 181,100. 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Cost of training, communication and information dissemination 
Public awareness campaigns are conducted at the central level through related 
directorates under the Department of Livestock Services. In the field, respective District 
Livestock Services Offices are responsible for public awareness. Generally, information 
is circulated through mass media such as the national newspaper, national television 
channels, local radio stations, local newspapers, pamphlets and posters. Based on 
experience in 2012, there will be four, two and one training sessions provided annually 
to the farmers in each HRD, MRD and LRD, respectively. Per unit costs are based on 
personal communication with an officer who had worked in AICP (Dr. Nabin Ghimire, 
personal communication). The breakdown of the costs is shown in Table 7. The total 
costs associated with training, communication and information dissemination is 
estimated at US$ 77,207/year. 
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Table 7. Annual costs of training, communication and information dissemination  
Activities No. of 
districts 
No. of training 
sessions  
Per unit 
cost 
Total costs 
1. Training     
a. High risk  20 20*4= 80 $229 $229*80= $18,320 
b. Medium risk 21 21*2= 42 $229 $229*42= $9,618 
c. Low risk 34 34*1= 34 $229 $229*34= $7,786 
d. Regional   5 $1,143 $1,143*5= $5,715 
e. Central  1 $1,143 $1,143*1= $1,143 
2. Broadcasting     
a. High risk  20  $229 $229*20= $4,580 
b. Medium risk 21  $114 $114*21= $2,394 
c. Low risk 34  $57 $57*34= $1,938 
d. Regional     $2,857 
e. Central    $11,428 
3. Pamphlets, 
posters printing 
   $11,428 
        Total costs  $77,207 
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The summary of the annual cost calculated for HPAI control under the CCP, 
assuming the number of birds being affected by HPAI per year being the same as in 
2012 (i.e., 19 outbreaks) is presented in Table 8:  
 
 
 
Table 8. Summary of the annual costs of the current control program  
Activities Year 1 
Surveillance  $118,290 
Stamping out operation and compensation  $181,100 
Training, communication and information $77,207 
Total $376,597 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Identification of relevant losses under the current control program 
Losses incurred under the CCP were grouped as (1) Losses due to HPAI caused 
mortality among poultry, (2) Losses due to culling of poultry beyond the losses covered 
by government compensation, (3) Losses due to production, movement and a trade ban 
period imposed by the government and (4) Losses due to market reaction. Each of these 
losses is elaborated below.  
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3.2.2.1 Losses due to HPAI caused mortality 
In 2012, a total mortality of 41,100 poultry in Nepal was reported to OIE. Out of 
this total, 34,872 were commercial layers, 2,850 were commercial broilers, 1,410 were 
backyard poultry and 1,968 were broiler parents. As farmers receive compensation only 
for poultry killed by the government as part of the control program, farmers’ losses were 
calculated based on the prevailing farm gate price of the respective category of poultry. 
The farm gate price used in this study was obtained from the World Bank’s 
Implementation Completion and Results Report of HPAI control project in Nepal. The 
total annual direct loss due to HPAI related mortality based on the farm gate price was 
US$ 298,922. The breakdown is shown in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9. Annual direct loss to farmers due to HPAI related mortality 
Type of poultry Cases Farm Gate Price Total  
CL 34,872 $7.4 $258,053 
CB 2,850 $3.0 $8,550 
BC 1,410 $3.8 $5,358 
BP 1,968 $13.7 $26,961 
Total 41,100  $298,922 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; BC: Backyard chicken; BP: Broiler 
parent 
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3.2.2.2 Losses due to culling of poultry 
Whenever an index case is identified and officially declared, the Nepali 
government imposes stamping out operations as per the BFCO. Based on the 
epidemiological situation, a team under the Livestock Department decides how wide 
(commonly 0 to 3 km) the culling area will be. As farmers received some compensation 
for poultry killed (which was accounted for under the costs of the program), farmers’ 
losses were calculated by subtracting the compensation they received from the prevailing 
farm gate price of the respective category of poultry. The total annual direct loss due to 
the culling of poultry was estimated at US$ 101,826. The breakdown is shown in Table 
10. 
 
 
Table 10. Annual direct losses to farmers due to the culling of poultry 
Type of poultry No. 
Culled 
Compensation Farm Gate 
Price  
Per unit 
loss 
Total Loss 
 CL 1,6748 $1.5 $7.4 $5.9 $98,813 
CB 150 $1.5 $3.0 $1.5 $225 
BC 1,212 $1.5 $3.8 $2.3 $2,788 
Total 18,110    $101,826 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; BC: Backyard chicken 
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3.2.2.3 Losses due to a production ban period imposed by the government 
The Nepali government imposes a production ban period of 45 days according to 
the provision of the BFCO in the outbreak zone. This causes additional losses to the 
farmers, elaborated below, as they will be out of business at least for a period of 45 days. 
 
3.2.2.3.1 Losses to backyard farmers 
Although the ban period is 45 days, it generally takes 6 months for backyard 
farmers to resume their poultry business (Dr. N.P.S Karki, personal communication). 
This is because of the difficulty of obtaining replacement flocks. It is estimated that 
during this 6 month period, each affected household loses 22 marketable chickens  and 
on average 35 households are affected in each outbreak (Dr. N.P.S Karki, personal 
communication), with US$ 3.8 per kg and an average weight per chicken of 2 kg, the 
farmers’ loss is estimated to be US$ 5,896 per outbreak. With 19 outbreaks per year, the 
total annual loss is estimated at US$ 112,024. In addition, traders lose US$ 22,405 (20% 
of farm gate price).  Therefore, the total loss in the backyard poultry system due to the 
ban in rearing was estimated at US$ 134,429. 
 
3.2.2.3.2 Losses to broiler farmers 
It has been observed that broiler farmers lose 2 cycles of broiler production due 
to HPAI (Dr. N.P.S Karki, personal communication). The average margin in each broiler 
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is US$ 0.4. In 2012, 3,000 broilers were culled or died from HPAI H5N1. If farmers do 
not raise broilers for 2 cycles, they will lose an estimated 2*3,000*$0.4= US$ 2,400. In 
addition, traders lose US$ 480 (20% of farm gate price) and meat processors lose US$ 
600 (25% of farm gate price) (Dr. N.P.S Karki, personal communication). Therefore, the 
total loss to the broiler industry due to the ban period was estimated at US$ 3,480. 
 
3.2.2.3.3 Losses to layer farmers 
The average profit per egg for farmers is US$ 0.009. As 51,620 layers died or 
were destroyed in 2012, we assumed an average daily egg loss of 37,166 (assuming an 
average laying capacity of 72%). Over the course of 45 days, it is estimated that farmers 
lose 37,166*45 days*$0.009= US$15,291 from eggs.  After the ban period is over, if 
farmers restock immediately, they need to wait another 5 months for layers to produce 
eggs. From this, farmers will additionally lose income for 150 days*$0.009*37,166= 
US$ 50,971. The cumulative loss will thus be US$ 66,262. Traders lose US$ 13,252 
(20% of farm gate price) and egg retailers lose US$ 6,626 (10% of farm gate price).  
Therefore, the total loss by the layer industry, due to the ban period, is estimated at US$ 
86,140 annually. 
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3.2.2.3.4 Losses due to market reaction 
It is very difficult to accurately estimate the losses associated with the market 
reaction due to HPAI. The most important losses are those due to the reduction in the 
consumption of poultry and poultry products, and losses due to the reduction in prices of 
poultry and poultry products. The sale of day old chicks (DOCs) will decrease as many 
farmers remain out of business and new farmers do not want to start poultry farming 
around the time of outbreaks.  These types of effects are not uniform across the country. 
For the purpose of this study, we assumed that HPAI outbreaks and concurrent poultry 
mortalities falsely believed to be due to HPAI will affect 10% of the total volume of 
national commercial poultry production annually. With this volume (10%) of affected 
production, we assumed that consumption will remain fairly similar while there will be 
20% reduction in poultry meat price and 10% reduction in egg price (Dr. Rajesh Bhatta, 
personal communication). Backyard poultry are mostly fed leftovers and, therefore, 
backyard producer are able to wait and sell their products when prices stabilize. We 
assumed that there will be no indirect effects for backyard poultry farmers other than 
those directly affected by the outbreaks. 
According to the data published in the MyRepublica national daily newspaper, 
published in Kathmandu quoting Dr. T.C Bhattarai, leading poultry entrepreneur in 
Nepal, on October 7, 2012 (www.myrepublica.com), the estimated total broiler meat 
production was 132.17 million kg and total egg production was 1.11 billion eggs in 
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2012. Likewise, 78.87 million broiler DOCs and 10 million layer DOCs were produced. 
More than 646,000 tons of poultry feed were produced. We used these data to calculate 
the losses to the commercial sector, as official government data were not available for 
2012.  
 
3.2.2.3.4.1 Loss due to the reduction in the price of poultry  
The loss due to the reduction in the price of poultry and poultry products was 
estimated at US$ 6,037,317. A breakdown is shown in Table 11.  
 
 
Table 11. Loss due to the reduction in the price of poultry and its products 
Items Total 
Production 
10% of 
production 
Price 
/ Unit 
% of price 
reduction 
Price loss 
/ unit 
Total loss 
Broiler 
meat 
132,170,000 13,217,000 $1.9 20 $0.38 $5,022,460 
Eggs 1,110,000,000 111,000,000 $0.09 10 $0.009 $1,014,857 
Total      $6,037,317 
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3.2.2.3.4.2 Loss due to reduction in the price of DOCs 
In Nepal, 78.87 million of broiler DOCs and 10 million of layer DOCs were 
produced in 2012 (www.myrepublica.com). The price of a broiler DOCs ranges from 
US$ 0.63 - 0.86 depending upon the supply and demand situation whereas the price of a 
layer DOC varies from US$ 0.74 - 0.97. For the purpose of this study, we assumed that 
10% of the total DOCs produced will suffer price reduction due to HPAI (Dr. Rajesh 
Bhatta, personal communication). We assumed US$ 0.74 as the average price for a 
broiler DOC while US$ 0.86 for a layer DOCs (Dr. Rajesh Bhatta, personal 
communication). During outbreaks, generally DOCs prices come down by about US$ 
0.23 per DOC (Dr. Rajesh Bhatta, personal communication). This will cause a loss of 
7,887,000*$0.23= US$ 1,814,010 to the broiler DOC producer while it will cause a loss 
of 1,000,000*$0.23= US$ 230,000 to the layer DOC producers. The total loss to the 
DOC producers will be US$ 2,044,010. 
 
3.2.3 Description of the absence of control measures (ACM) 
3.2.3.1 Costs under the absence of control measures 
The absence of control measures (ACM) means that the government would take no 
action towards the control of AI. Under this option, there would be no active 
surveillance and subsequent sample testing, stamping out operations, training seminars, 
or communication and information dissemination activities focused on AI. Farmers will 
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not receive any compensation for losses. There will be no ban period for the poultry in 
the outbreak zone. Therefore, the cost of the ACM would be zero.  
 
3.2.3.2 Losses under the absence of control measures 
It is impossible to predict with certainty how many additional outbreaks and the 
associated losses would occur if the CCP is withdrawn. For the purpose of this study, 
under the ACM, we assumed that without the current control efforts, the number of birds 
that would die due to HPAI would double each subsequent year during our evaluation 
period. Under these assumptions, the following losses have been identified for the ACM: 
(1) Losses due to HPAI caused mortality and (2) Losses due to market reaction. 
. 
3.2.3.2.1 Losses due to HPAI caused mortality 
Based on the assumed consequences of ceasing any control strategies, we 
estimate the number of birds dying from HPAI would double each subsequent year. 
Farmers’ loss was calculated based on the prevailing farm gate price of the respective 
category of poultry. The total direct loss due to HPAI related mortality based on farm 
gate price was US$ 597,845 in the first year, $1,195,690 in the second year and $ 
2,391,319 in the third year (Table 12).  
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Table 12. Loss due to HPAI related mortality under absence of control measures 
 CL
* 
CB
* 
BC
* 
BP
* 
Total 
Farm gate price $7.4 $3.0 $3.8 $13.7  
Cases 1
st
 yr 69,744 5,700 2,820 3,936  
Losses 1
st
 yr $516,106 $17,100 $10,716 $53,923 $597,845 
Cases 2
nd
 yr 139,488 11,400 5,640 7,872  
Losses 2
nd
 yr $1,032,211 $34,200 $21,432 $107,846 $1,195,690 
Cases 3
rd
 yr 278,976 22,800 11,280 15,744  
Losses 3
rd
 yr $2,064,422 $68,400 $42,864 $215,693 $2,391,379 
Total loss     $4,184,914 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; BC: Backyard chicken; BP: Broiler 
parent 
 
 
3.2.3.2.1 Losses due to market reaction 
For the purpose of this study, we assumed the losses due to market reaction 
would be identical to the losses under the CCP, i.e., the estimated total annual loss was 
US$ 8,081,920. Assuming the same market loss under ACM as under the CCP may be 
considered as an underestimation of the loss because a larger number of outbreaks may 
provoke a stronger market reaction.  On the other hand, an invalid assumed higher 
market loss could lead to an overestimated benefit of the current program.  
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3.2.4 Description of the vaccination program 
Vaccination is one of the options employed to control HPAI. Inactivated AI 
vaccines have helped prevent morbidity, mortality, egg production loss, and control the 
spread of disease and reduce economic losses (Halvorson, 2002).  
At least 80% of the susceptible poultry population in a flock needs to be 
vaccinated to control the infection (Tiensin et al., 2007). However, it is very hard to 
achieve this level of vaccination coverage in a country like Nepal, where there are large 
numbers of backyard birds. Thus, it would seem reasonable to target vaccination of 60% 
of the national flock two times per year using an H5 vaccine, e.g. 
A/Goose/Guangdong/1996 (Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Harbin, Heilongjiang 
province, China). Under this program, it is reasonable to expect that a few outbreaks 
(possibly smaller scale) would still occur. Thus, it would seem reasonable to expect that 
approximately 20% of the birds lost on under the CCP would die under the vaccination 
program. 
 
3.2.4.1 Identification of relevant costs (inputs) under the vaccination option 
 Costs incurred during the vaccination option are:  (1) Cost of vaccine, (2) Cost 
of administering vaccine, (3) Costs of surveillance (farm visits sample collection and 
laboratory testing), (4) Cost of stamping out operation and compensation (5) Cost of 
training, communication and information dissemination. 
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3.2.4.1.1 Costs of vaccine 
The average cost per dose of AI H5 vaccine is about US$ 0.04 as per prevailing 
market price. The total cost of the vaccine purchase would depend upon the poultry 
population to be vaccinated. Based on the current population size and the growth rate of 
7% for broilers, 5% for layers (Dr. N.P.S. Karki, personal communication) and 3% for 
backyard chickens while duck population were decreasing by 2% annually (MoAD, 
2011), the population size for the coming years and the number of birds to be vaccinated 
were predicted (Table 13). 
 
 
Table 13. Poultry population in Nepal 
Type Yr 1 60% of  
Yr 1 
Yr 2 60% of  
Yr 2 
Yr 3 60% of Yr 
3 
CB
*
 50,000,000
 
30,000,000 53,500,000 3,2100,000 57,245,000 34,347,000 
CL
*
 6,000,000
 
3,600,000 6,300,000 3,780,000 6,615,000 3,969,000 
LP
*
 120,000
 
72,000 126,000 75,600 132,300 79,380 
BP
*
 1,130,000
 
678,000 1,209,100 725,460 1,293,737 776,242 
BC
* 
11,592,168 6,955,301 11,939,933 7,163,960 12,298,131 7,378,879 
BD
* 
379,753 227,852 372,158 223,295 364,715 218,829 
* Data source for commercial: www.myrepublica.com  
Data source for backyard: Statistical information on Nepalese agriculture, MoAD, 2011 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; LP: Layers parent; BP: Broiler 
parent; BC: Backyard chickens; BD: Backyard ducks 
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The cost of vaccine was calculated as: Cost of vaccine = cost of one dose * 
number of vaccinations per year*60% of the population.  The total cost of vaccine 
purchased for 3 years would be US$ 10,589,663. Breakdown of this cost is shown in 
Table 14. 
 
 
 
Table 14. Cost of vaccine 
Type Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Total 
CB
* 
$2,400,000 $2,568,000 $2,747,760 $7,715,760 
CL
* 
$288,000 $302,400 $317,520 $907,920 
LP* $5,760 $6,048 $6,350 $18,158 
BP
* 
$54,240 $58,037 $62,099 $174,376 
BC
* 
$556,424 $573,117 $590,310 $1,719,851 
BD
* 
$18,228 $17,863 $17,506 $53,598 
Total $3,322,652 $3,525,465 $3,741,546 $10,589,663 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; LP: Layers parent; BP: Broiler 
parent; BC: Backyard chickens; BD: Backyard ducks 
 
 
 
3.2.4.1.2 Costs of vaccine administration 
AI vaccines are administered subcutaneously (Steitz et al., 2010). This makes 
vaccination tedious and costly. The average prevailing price for vaccinating an 
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individual bird in Nepal is US$ 0.002 (Dr. Rajesh Bhatta, personal communication). 
The cost of vaccine administration was calculated as: Cost of vaccine administration per 
bird* number of vaccinations per year*60% of the population. The total cost of vaccine 
administration for 3 years was US$ 605,124. Breakdown of this cost is shown in Table 
15. 
 
 
Table 15. Costs of vaccine administration 
Type Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Total 
CB
* 
$137,143 $146,743 $157,015 $440,901 
CL
* 
$16,547 $17,280 $18,144 $51,881 
LP
*
 $329 $346 $363 $1,038 
BP
* 
$3,099 $3,316 $3,549 $9,964 
BC* $31,796 $32,749 $33,732 $98,277 
BD
* 
$1,042 $1,021 $1,000 $3,063 
Total $189,866 $201,455 $213,803 $605,124 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; LP: Layers parent; BP: Broiler 
parent; BC: Backyard chickens; BD: Backyard ducks 
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3.2.4.1.3 Cost of surveillance during vaccination program  
We assumed that the cost of surveillance under vaccination program will be 
identical to the cost of surveillance incurred under the CCP.  The cost, under this 
heading, is estimated to be US$ 118,290 annually. 
 
3.2.4.1.4 Cost of stamping out operation and compensation 
We assumed that under the vaccination program, there would be a few outbreaks 
where 20% of the birds affected under the CCP (baseline) would die from HPAI. 
Considering US$ 10 as the cost of stamping out operation and compensation per bird, 
the cost of stamping out and compensation would be 3,622 (20% birds of the baseline) * 
US$ 10= US$ 36,220 annually. 
 
3.2.4.1.5 Cost of training, communication and information dissemination 
We assumed that the cost of training, communication and information 
dissemination under the vaccination program would be identical to the cost incurred in 
the CCP.  The total cost, under this heading, was estimated to be US$ 77,207 annually. 
 
3.2.4.2 Identification of relevant losses under the vaccination option 
Losses under the vaccination option are:  (1) losses due to HPAI related 
mortality, and (2) losses due to culling of poultry. 
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3.2.4.2.1 Losses due to HPAI related mortality 
Under our assumption that 20% of the birds would die from HPAI compared to 
the baseline (CCP), the total estimated direct loss due to HPAI related mortality based on 
the farm gate price in 3 years was US$ 59,787 annually (Table 16). 
 
Table 16. Annual loss to farmers due to HPAI caused mortality in vaccination program 
 CL
* 
CB
* 
BC
* 
BP
* 
Total 
Farm gate price $7.4 $3.0 $3.8 $13.7  
Cases 6974 570 282 3,94  
Losses  $51,608 $1,710 $1,071 $5,398 $59,787 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; LP: Layers parent; BP: Broiler 
parent; BC: Backyard chickens 
 
 
3.2.4.2.2 Losses due to culling of poultry 
Under our assumption that 20% of the birds would be culled due to HPAI 
compared to the baseline, the total direct loss due to HPAI related culling based on per 
unit loss (farm gate price after deducting compensation) in 3 years was US$ 20,365 
annually (Table 17). 
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Table 17. Annual loss to farmers due to culling of poultry under vaccination program 
 CL
* 
CB
* 
BC
* 
Total 
Per unit loss $5.9 $1.5 $2.3  
Cases 3,350 30 242  
Losses $19,762 $65 $558 $20,365 
*
CL: Commercial layers; CB: Commercial broilers; BC: Backyard chickens 
 
 
3.2.4.3 Identification of benefits under the vaccination program 
We assumed that the vaccination program would help resume the domestic 
poultry market to a pre-outbreak level and it would prevent part of the costs associated 
with stamping out operation and compensation. As Nepal is primarily an importer of 
poultry and export is negligible, there will be no effect on the international poultry trade.  
The benefits of the vaccination program would be the losses prevented that 
would have otherwise occurred under the CCP. Annual losses prevented (benefits) was 
US$ 8,707,116.  
 
3.2.5 Sensitivity analysis 
We performed a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of our program 
under different discount rates (3%, 10% and 15%), different numbers of birds dying 
under the ACM (200% increase, 50% increase and 50% decrease compared to the CCP 
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baseline), different market reactions (5% and 15%) and different number of birds dying 
under the vaccination program (10%, 20% and 50% compared to the CCP baseline). We 
also calculated the break-even points for the market loss and the number of birds dying. 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 “Current control program” vs “absence of control measures” 
Economic evaluation showed that CCP is better than ACM option. The B-C was 
1.96 and the net present value (NPV) was US$ 989,918 (Table 18). 
 
 
Table 18. Summary of the cost and benefits of “current control program (CCP)” vs 
“absence of control measures (ACM)” 
 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Total 
Loss in ACM $8,679,172 $9,277,017 $10,472,706 $28,428,895 
Loss in CCP $8,707,117 $8,707,117 $8,707,117 $26,121,351 
Benefit -$27,945 $569,900 $1,765,590 $2,307,545 
PVB at 5% discount rate -$26,614 $516,916 $1,525,183 $2,015,485 
Costs of CCP $376,597 $376,597 $376,597 $1,129,791 
PVC at 5% discount rate $358,664 $341,584 $325,319 $1,025,567 
NPV (Net present value) -$385,278 $175,332 $1,199,864 $989,918 
B-C ratio    1.96 
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3.3.2 “Vaccination” vs “current control program” 
The economic evaluation showed that vaccination is better than CCP. The B-C 
was 2.41 and the NPV was US$ 13,745,454 (Table 19).  
 
 
Table 19. Summary of the cost and benefits of “vaccination” vs “current control 
program (CCP)” 
 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Total 
Loss in CCP $8,707,117 $8,707,117 $8,707,117 $26,121,351 
Loss in “vaccination” $80,150 $80,150 $80,150 $240,450 
Benefit $8,626,967 $8,626,967 $8,626,967 $25,880,901 
PVB at 5% discount rate $8,216,159 $7,824,913 $7,452,298 $23,493,370 
Added Costs of “vaccination” $3,367,638 $3,582,040 $3,810,469 $10,760,147 
PVC at 5% discount rate $3,207,274 $3,249,016 $3,291,626 $9,747,916 
NPV (Net present value) $5,008,885 $4,575,897 $4,160,672 $13,745,454 
B-C ratio    2.41 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis was conducted to test the effect of the assumed discount 
rate, market reaction, the number of predicted birds affected under the ACM and 
vaccination program on the results of CBA.  
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3.3.3.1 Discount rate 
In addition to the 5% discount rate assumed for the main analysis, we evaluated 
the control options using the discount rates of 3%, 10% and 15%. The NPVs and B-C 
ratios under different discount rates are presented in Table 20. Under the considered 
discount rates, the calculated NPVs were positive and B-C ratios were still higher than 1 
which indicates that it is better to implement either of the two control programs than 
doing nothing. 
 
Table 20. Net present values and benefit-cost ratios under different discount rates 
  NPV B-C 
 CCP vs ACM   
Discount rates 3% $1,060,573 1.995 
 5% $989,918 1.965 
 10% $835,560 1.892 
 15% $707,675 1.823 
 Vaccination vs CCP   
Discount rates 3% $14,269,250 2.408 
 5% $13,745,454 2.410 
 10% $12,568,275 2.414 
 15% $11,554,944 2.419 
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3.3.3.2 Market reaction 
Sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the magnitude of a different 
market loss than that assumed in the main analysis. Specifically, we evaluated the effect 
of changing market loss in the CCP and ACM from 10% (main analysis) to 15% and 5% 
in ACM, while for all analysis the market loss under the vaccination program was 0%. 
The NPVs and B-C ratios under different market loss scenarios are presented in Table 
21. Additionally, we calculated a break-even point (a situation of no gain or loss), where 
the NPV becomes zero, for both the ACM and vaccination options. Break-even analysis 
showed that there would be no gain or loss from application of the vaccination program 
if the market loss under CCP would be only 3.75% (US$ 3,033,879) (note that a fixed 
0% market loss was assumed for the vaccination program). Since market loss could be 
different under the CCP and ACM programs, different combinations of market losses for 
the two programs could present the break-even points. For example, a break-even point 
was identified when the market loss was 9.55% (US$ 7,717,821) under ACM and 10% 
under CCP. Another break-even point was identified when the market loss was 0% 
under the CCP albeit it was 4.49% (US$ 363,506) under ACM. 
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Table 21. Net present value and benefit-cost ratio under different market loss 
  NPV B-C 
 CCP vs ACM   
Market loss 15% $11,993,648 12.694 
 10% $989,918 1.965 
 5% -$10,013,812 -8.760 
 CCP vs Vaccination   
 15% $24,749,184 3.538 
 10% $13,745,454 2.410 
 5% $2,741,723 1.281 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3.3 Number of birds affected 
In the main analysis, we assumed that there would be a 100% increase in the 
number of birds affected each year under the ACM option. For sensitivity analysis, we 
evaluated scenarios assuming that there could be a 200% or 50% increase or a 50% 
decrease in the number of birds affected by HPAI under the ACM option. The results are 
shown in Table 22. The break-even point analysis showed that it is justified to continue 
with the CCP only if the number of birds dying due to HPAI increases by more than 
76% every year during the evaluation period. The CCP would not be justified if the 
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number of birds dying due to HPAI would increase by less than 76% every year and 
obviously if it would decrease (which is unlikely).  
 
 
 
Table 22. Net present value and benefit-cost ratio under different assumptions for the 
change in the number of birds affected under absence of all measures  
 NPV B-C 
CCP vs ACM   
100% increase in birds dying $989,918 1.965 
200% increase in birds dying $7,539,153 8.350 
50% increase in birds dying -$818,473 0.201 
50% decrease in birds dying -$2,484,640 -1.422 
 
 
 
3.3.3.4 Outbreaks under the vaccination program 
In the main analysis, we assumed that under vaccination, a few smaller outbreaks 
would continue to occur. These outbreaks would incur a loss of 20% of the birds 
affected under the CCP. To test this assumption, we evaluated the different scenarios 
where 0%, 10%, and 50% of birds lost under the CCP baseline would die despite 
vaccination. Results showed that when the number of birds affected under the 
vaccination option is at 0%, 10%, and 50% of the baseline, B-C ratio was 2.457, 2.340 
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and 2.433 while NPV was US$ 14,062,357, US$ 13,903,906, and US$ 13,270,099, 
respectively. In these cases, it is worth to invest in the vaccination even if there are 
outbreaks. However this conclusion would change if the market loss under the CCP was 
different from the assumed 10%. The break-even point would occur when the market 
loss was 3.75% in CCP compared to no market loss in vaccination.    
 
3.4 Discussion 
We performed CBA to evaluate whether the investment into the current control 
program (CCP) to control HPAI currently being operated in Nepal, is justified compared 
to alternatives of absence of control measures (ACM) and the vaccination options. In 
terms of the B-C, our findings indicated that there is a return of 1.96 dollars for every 
dollar spent by the CCP compared to ACM. The net present value of the CCP versus 
absence of control measures was US$ 989,918. The vaccination program yields a return 
of 2.41 dollars for every dollar spent when compared to CCP. The net present value of 
vaccination versus the CCP was US$ 13,745,454.  
 Fasina et al. (2007) have reported a return of $52 for every dollar invested in 
vaccination program compared to doing nothing in Nigeria. Such a high estimated B-C 
compared to ours might be due to the differences in the baseline outbreak losses between 
Nigeria and Nepal. Outbreak loss was very high in Nigeria compared to Nepal. This 
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resulted in the prediction of prevention of a huge loss after vaccination compared to 
Nepal.  
Nepal’s export market of poultry and poultry products is negligible. However, it 
is near to being self sufficient to meet the domestic demands for poultry meat and eggs; 
albeit it has to import parent stocks and vaccines. Under these conditions, safeguarding 
domestic poultry industry is a priority for Nepal. In case that the number of outbreaks 
continues to increase, it would be highly recommended for Nepal to adopt the 
vaccination control program. Naeem (2003) has reported that mass vaccination program 
and bio-security helped overcome HPAI in Pakistan. However, though the vaccine 
protects from the clinical disease, there is a possibility that asymptomatic virus 
circulation may continue and result in the spread of infection (Ellis et al., 2004). Our B-
C and NPV for vaccination program compared to CCP might be an overestimation as we 
had assumed there would be no market loss under the vaccination program. If there 
would be a market loss under vaccination, then the B-C ratio and the NPV would be 
lower. 
The performed CBA has important limitations. We did not consider the public 
health implications of HPAI in Nepal as there have been no recorded HPAI related 
human illnesses in Nepal. Therefore, we implicitly assumed that there will be no human 
health losses in the future and under the evaluated alternative control scenarios. If human 
health losses would indeed occur, our estimate of the benefits would be underestimated. 
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We did not consider other indirect benefits of HPAI control programs in Nepal, such as 
an increased availability of animal proteins to the backyard poultry farmers. Backyard 
farmers mostly rely on the eggs and chicken meat produced in their own house for 
protein source. When birds die due to HPAI and they remain out of poultry rearing 
during production and production ban period, their protein supply would decrease but it 
is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, not accounting for this indirect benefit may have 
underestimated the total benefits of the evaluated CCP and vaccination programs.  
In conclusion, implementation of one of the control programs, either the CCP or 
the proposed vaccination program, should be used rather than ceasing to implement 
HPAI control measures in Nepal. Vaccination would be better than the CCP; however, 
the concerns related to AI vaccination regarding the possibility of asymptomatic virus 
circulation need to be further evaluated before its implementation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Avian influenza (AI), a viral disease caused by influenza A virus, is mainly a 
disease of birds. Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) can be divided into highly pathogenic 
(HPAI) or low pathogenic (LPAI) based on their ability to cause disease. Among these 
two types, HPAI are of concern mainly for two reasons. First, they infect humans (Yee 
et al., 2009) and second, they cause huge monetary losses to poultry farmers, industry 
and government through poultry mortalities and the control programs implemented to 
control the infection spread. The overall economic loss due to HPAI is negligible 
compared to their gross domestic product (GDP). However, the economic loss to the 
smallholder farmers, whose major source of income comes from selling poultry, is 
particularly important because of low resilience of smallholders to recover from the 
economic loss they suffer. HPAI became of global concern when human infections were 
noticed in Hong Kong in 1997 where18 people were laboratory confirmed with HPAI 
H5N1 infections and six people died among them (FAO, 2013). Before the confirmed 
human infections in Hong Kong in 1997, there was an outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in a 
geese farm in Guangdong province, China (Xu et al., 1999). HPAI H5N1 then spread to 
Southeast Asian countries and gradually to Europe and Africa and finally became 
endemic in Asia (Lupiani and Reddy, 2009). In Nepal, HPAI H5N1 infection was 
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detected for the first time in January 2009 in domestic chickens. Since this first outbreak, 
more than 54 outbreaks have been officially reported by the Nepali government to the 
World Animal Health Organization (OIE) as of April 2013 (OIE, 2013). The objective of 
this thesis was to improve the understanding of the epidemiology of AI and the 
economic worth of its control in Nepal. The objectives were addressed through two 
independent studies. The main conclusions of these studies are summarized below.  
It is necessary to improve understanding of the epidemiology of AI to better 
control it. In this regard, understanding the epidemiology of AI in ducks is important as 
ducks may “silently” harbor the infection and transmit it to other susceptible hosts, such 
as chickens (Henning et al., 2011). A large number of duck farms exist in Kathmandu 
district of Nepal. On these farms, ducks are mainly raised in a scavenging system. In that 
system, ducks have access to ponds, rivers and other water bodies in the daytime where 
they have the opportunity to mingle with wild birds and backyard chickens. Due to such 
production practices, Kathmandu has been considered as a high risk district for HPAI 
outbreaks in Nepal since 2007. However, no clinical outbreaks were detected in 
Kathmandu until January 2012. Nevertheless, it was suspected that the AIVs had been 
circulating in Kathmandu even before the first detected outbreak. To assess that  
suggestion, we conducted a cross-sectional study to determine the presence of AI in 
Kathmandu ducks and estimate the seroprevalence of AIV antibodies in domestic ducks 
of Kathmandu using serum samples collected in 2011 (Chapter II). The estimated 
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prevalence of AIV antibodies was 27.2% [95% Confidence Interval (CI): 24.6- 29.5]. 
This indicates that AIVs were circulating in domestic ducks in Kathmandu even before 
the detected outbreak of HPAI in poultry. However, the subtypes of AIVs circulating 
among ducks in Kathmandu in the summer of 2011 remain unknown. Having discovered 
that AI is present among ducks in Kathmandu, the next question was to identify the risk 
factors for the carriage of antibodies. As potential risk factors, we considered age and 
sex of ducks and farm size. In bivariate analysis at 20% confidence level, all the three 
risk factors were significantly associated with the antibodies carriage in ducks. However, 
the final multivariable model that controlled for clustering of ducks within farms, 
identified age as the only significant risk factor. Based on this model, ducks older than 
one year were more likely to be seropositive compared to ducks less than six months of 
age [Odds Ratio (OR) = 2.17 (95% CI: 1.07- 4.39)]. However, there were no statistically 
significant differences between the ducks ages less than six months of age and six 
months to one year of age [OR= 0.50 (95% CI: 0.18- 1.36)]. Finally, we wanted to know 
what proportion of farms raising pigs also has seropositive ducks. This is relevant 
considering that a pig could become infected with AI virus (Yasuda et al., 1991) 
providing an opportunity for the mixing of influenza viruses from ducks and pigs and 
possible emergence of new influenza viruses. Among all enrolled farms, 50% raised pigs 
and of the farms that raised pigs 51.6% (95% CI: 33.1- 69.8%) had seropositive ducks. 
We did not test the pigs for AIVs in those farms; however the presence of seropositive 
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ducks on farms having pigs indicates the necessity of monitoring and testing of pigs on 
those farms.   
Nepali government has been implementing a control program for HPAI since 
2007. Despite the control program, outbreaks have continued to occur. This raised 
suggestions for implementation of alternative programs.  However, careful evaluation of 
the economic feasibility of the alternatives is necessary before deciding on any new 
control strategy. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is often a method of choice when long-
term control programs are desired at the national level (Dijkhuizen et al., 1995). This is 
the approach we have taken to evaluate the costs and benefits of HPAI control in Nepal 
(Chapter III). First, we compared the current control program (CCP) for HPAI in Nepal 
and the alternative of absence of control measures (ACM). Our analysis indicated a cost-
benefit ratio of 1.96, which indicates that there is a return of 1.96 dollars for every dollar 
spent on the CCP compared to ACM. The cost-benefit ratio as a measure is to show how 
much return we obtain from each dollar we invest. This approach allows quick 
assessment of the worth of an investment but has limitations, such as it doesn’t take 
account of the investment scale while decision making; rather it just looks at the ratio. 
Therefore we also used another measure, the net present value (NPV) which gives the 
actual difference between the benefits and costs. The net present value of the CCP versus 
ACM was US$ 989,918. That means that Nepal should continue with the ongoing 
control program. That being said, despite the ongoing control efforts, outbreaks of HPAI 
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still continue to occur in Nepal. Therefore, vaccination has been considered as a 
potential alternative control strategy. Hence, we compared the CCP for control of HPAI 
in Nepal to a potential new strategy that would involve vaccination of 60% of the 
domestic poultry flock twice a year. The vaccination program yielded a B-C ratio 
indicating a return of 2.41 dollars for every dollar spent when compared to the CCP. The 
NPV of vaccination versus CCP was US$ 13,745,454. These results mean that 
vaccination program is more cost effective compared to the CCP. Because of missing 
information and because future can never be predicted with certainty, our analysis was 
based on several assumptions, the most important ones being about the appropriate 
discount rate, the future annual number of birds affected, the extent of market loss, and 
the effectiveness of vaccination to control the infection. Sensitivity analysis of these 
uncertainties indicated a reasonable robustness of the results to the assumptions made. 
However, we recommend additional studies in Nepal before choosing the most 
appropriate option for HPAI control because there might be other options for HPAI 
control such as strengthening bio-security measures on the farms, vaccinating only 
commercial poultry or poultry in high risk districts only. Since we did not conduct 
analysis for these options in the current study, it is recommended that they be analyzed 
in the future. 
In summary, this thesis improved understanding of the overall epidemiology and 
economics of AI, particularly HPAI, in Nepal. The conducted cross-sectional serosurvey 
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was the first study of the kind conducted in Kathmandu, Nepal to estimate the 
seroprevalence of AIV antibodies presence in ducks of Kathmandu. This study serves as 
a baseline for the AIV antibodies presence in ducks in the major duck raising areas of 
Kathmandu and identified the high-risk group that can be targeted in surveillance 
activities. We recommend that future studies should be conducted to differentiate the 
subtypes of AIV present among domestic ducks in Kathmandu, with particular interest in 
the presence of HPAI virus. In the CBA, the returns in benefits for the costs of the 
evaluated control programs supported a continued investment into the CCP as opposed 
to ceasing control measures and suggested that vaccination may be an even better control 
alternative. The CBA study was also the first study of the kind conducted to estimate the 
costs and benefits of alternatives to the CCP for HPAI control in Nepal. However, for 
further CBA of HPAI control in Nepal, it is necessary to find the baseline information, 
such as about the true market loss due to HPAI outbreaks. Amidst several limitations, we 
believe that our studies contributed to an improved overall understanding of the 
epidemiology of AI and the economic worth of its control in Nepal. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Total samples collected as a part of national surveillance plan for HPAI per year 
 
 
Appendix A. Total samples collected as a part of the national surveillance plan per year 
Types Number of samples 
Commercial poultry 5,700 
Backyard poultry 5,900 
Wild freshly dead birds from wild life areas / national parks 100 
Wild water birds (fresh feces) 560 
Domestic backyard ducks in wild water birds buffer zones 560 
Total  12,780 
 
